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Over the past 50 years, the United States government has engaged in a number of 
efforts designed to focus on the results of federal agencies and programs.  Starting in the 
1950s with “performance budgeting” and continuing through the 1960s and 1970s program 
budgeting and zero-based budgeting efforts, the goal of these has been a closer linkage 
between resources provided and results achieved.  In 1993, during the administration of 
President Bill Clinton, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was signed into 
law.  This act required federal agencies to engage in strategic planning, performance planning, 
and performance reporting. 
When the George W. Bush administration came into office, they inherited this legacy 
of attention to performance, but attempted to expand it, in particular to emphasize the use of 
performance data rather than its production.  The Bush effort has two parts.  The first, 
embodied in the President’s Management Agenda (PMA), is designed to encourage federal 
agencies to improve their management across five areas—financial management, human 
capital management, E-government, contracting out, and budget/performance integration.  
Agencies are evaluated according to standards established by the White House, in each of 
these areas.  These scores are translated into “traffic lights” (green, yellow, and red) for each.1  
The second Bush administration initiative, called the Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART), is the focus of this article.  The PART, unlike these past initiatives, focuses very 
much on evaluating programs, rather than whole agencies. 
In the article that follows, we will describe the background of the PART, discuss its 
use and impacts, and offer conclusions as to how to make systems similar to the PART more 
effective in practice. 
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1 For more information on this and for recent scores, see http://www.omb.gov. 
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PART: Overview and History 
The United States’ Bush administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is 
an attempt to assess the performance of all federal programs using a single set of criteria.  As 
such, the PART represents a departure from traditional performance measurement practices 
because it aims to facilitate the comparisons of programs with very different missions.  Under 
traditional performance measurement and performance budgeting systems, policymakers must 
grapple with tough decisions such as how to compare homeland security attacks averted to 
infant mortality decreases.  Even with programs that have similar missions, how does one 
compare decreases in mortality due to heart disease to decreases in mortality due to cancer?  
The PART attempts to surmount these hurdles by creating performance scores that can be 
compared across program areas and represents a positive step forward in performance 
budgeting practices.  Before the lessons of the PART could be applied to any other country, it 
is necessary to understand how the PART works and what its limitations are.   
The PART represents an effort to facilitate performance budgeting and as such, has 
roots in previous reforms of the American budgeting system.  In the United States, the origins 
of performance budgeting systems lie in the progressive movement’s efforts to promote the 
study of government programs and activities.  Early reforms include: the 1921 Budget and 
Accounting Act, which represented an attempt to limit government spending while making 
budgeting more transparent; the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 that created 
“performance budgeting” (which, contrary to its name, focused mostly on outputs, not 
results); and the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) of the 1960’s.2  
Successfully pioneered in the U.S. Department of Defense by then-Secretary, Robert 
McNamara, PPBS was President Lyndon Johnston’s attempt to create a planning-
programming-budgeting system.  Although it was intended to be employed throughout the 
entire federal government, difficulties in transferring the practice to civilian agencies caused 
the requirements to lapse in 1971.3  During the 1970’s efforts to integrate information on 
governmental performance and the allocation of resources continued including management 
by objectives (MBO) and zero-based budgeting (ZBB), but in the 1980’s government reform 
receded from public attention.4  Recent years have witnessed additional federal reforms, most 
notably the Government Performance and Results Act of 19935. 
 
                                                 
2 Melkers, J.E. & Willoughby, K. G. “Budgeters’ Views of State Performance Budgeting Systems: Distinctions 
Across Branches”  Public Administration Review. (2001). 
3 Joyce, P.G., “Performance Based Budgeting.”  In Handbook of Governmental Budgeting edited by R. T. 
Meyers (San Francisco, California: Jossey Bass, Inc., 1999). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Irving, S.  “Performance Budgeting: PART Focuses Attention on Program Performance, but More can be Done 
to Engage Congress.”  United States Government Accountability Office.  (2005). 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0628.pdf  
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As part of the fiscal year 2002 budget process, President Bush initiated the 
Presidential Management Agenda (PMA), a series of reforms aimed at improving the 
performance of the U.S government.  These reforms include the following: 
• Strategic Management of Human Capital: Reforms under the strategic management of 
human capital include restructuring workforces to increase the number of front-line 
employees, reducing organizational levels, and utilizing information technology to 
create knowledge management systems that can pass on the knowledge of retiring 
employees to new employees.6 
• Competitive Sourcing: These reforms include identifying government activities that 
could be outsourced, increasing the number of activities that are outsourced, and 
improving the competitive environment by subjecting contracts to renewed 
competition every three to five years.7 
• Improved Financial Performance: To improve financial performance, the Bush 
administration is requiring agencies to assess the full extent of their erroneous 
payment rates and implement accounting and reporting reforms to reduce these rates 
and make financial information more timely and accessible.8 
• Expanded Electronic Government: The administration is committing to increase the 
use of information technology in government with practices such as e-procurement, e-
grants, e-regulations, and e-signatures.  These reforms should increase the accessibility 
of government to citizens and business, improve information sharing between 
governments, and reduce internal costs by automating internal processes.9 
• Performance Improvement:   In addition to working with the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) on identifying programmatic objectives, agencies are expected to 
develop and track data on outcome measures, integrating these measures with cost 
information.  The ultimate goal of the initiative is to align performance measures with 
funding, eliminating or reforming programs that are not performing, while reinforcing 
successful programs.10 
A major component of the PMA, the goal of the PART process is to assess and 
improve program performance.  By identifying program strengths and weaknesses, the PART 
                                                 
6 Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget.  2002.  “The President’s Management 
Agenda.”  http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf, p.14. 
7 Ibid, p.18. 
8 Ibid, p.20. 
9 Ibid, p.23. 
10 Ibid, p.27. 
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is designed to be used as a management tool and to allocate resources between programs more 
effectively.  
The creation of the PART required the Office of Management and Budget to come up 
with a listing of federal programs.  Perhaps surprisingly, there was no established listing of 
“programs” in the federal budget.  The budget is organized variously by broad “functions” 
(national defense, health, etc.) or agency (the Department of Defense or Department of Health 
and Human Services, etc.)  or appropriation account (there are about 1200 of those, some of 
which are very large and contain many programs, and other of which may be small, single-
program, accounts).  None of these equated precisely to programs.  For this reason, OMB 
initially developed a listing of approximately 1000 programs after discussion with the relevant 
Departments and agencies.  The listing of programs as developed by OMB has continued to 
be refined and updated, which means that in some cases, “programs” have either expanded or 
ceased to exist over time.  The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that in defining 
programs OMB relied on the budget accounts used in the president’s budget, an approach that 
has been criticized as many program definitions are inconsistent with agency organization and 
strategic planning structures.11 
Once this list was developed, OMB stated its intent to evaluate approximately one-
fifth of these programs each year; by year 5, all 1000 would be evaluated.12 The PART 
assessment is done using a questionnaire, which is divided into four parts and then scored in 
the following categories:  13  
1. program purpose and design, attempting to determine whether program objectives and 
missions are clear and appropriate (weighted 20  percent);  
2. performance measurement, evaluations, and strategic planning, to find out the extent to 
which the agency sets itself valid goals, both long-term and annual (weighted 10 percent); 
3.  program management, which focuses on assesses financial management and program 
improvements (weighted 20 percent); and. 
4. program results, which program results, looks at the actual results agencies have achieved 
for their performance measures (weighted 50 percent).14  
                                                 
11 Brass, C. “The Bush Administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART).”  Congressional Research 
Service.  November 2004. 
12 This is a cumulative assessment.  In other words, in Year 1 200 programs would be evaluated, then 400 in year 
2 (the Year 1 programs plus 200 more), 600 in Year 3, etc. 
13 Office of Management and Budget.  “Program Assessment Rating Tool.”  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/index.html#background (accessed November 7, 2007). 
14 Office of Management and Budget.  2004. “Rating the Performance of Federal Programs.”  
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/budget/performance.pdf (accessed November 7, 2007). 
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Scores are assigned for each segment on a scale from 0 to 100 and totaled.  Based on 
the numeric score, programs can be classified as effective, moderately effective, adequate, or 
ineffective, as indicated in Table 1: 
    Table 1: Ranges for PART Ratings 
Rating Range 
Effective 85-100 
Moderately Effective 70-84 
Adequate 50-69 
Ineffective 0-49 
 
In addition, regardless of the score, OMB evaluates a program as “Results Not 
Demonstrated” in cases where the program does not have acceptable long term and annual 
performance measures.15  
Table 2 shows the number of programs evaluated, and the distribution of ratings of 
these programs, over the five years of the PART thus far.  As the table indicates, a 
progressively larger number of programs have been evaluated each year, and the scores, in 
general have been improving.  Of particular note is the substantial reduction in the “Results 
Not Demonstrated” category (50 percent of all programs were in this category in 2002, down 
to 22 percent in 2006).  By 2006, almost half of all programs evaluated received a score of 
moderately effective or higher, up from 30 percent in 2002.16  All PART assessments are 
readily available to the public through the OMB’s database, ExpectMore.gov - 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Office of Management and Budget, PART Training Slides, at 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/training/2007_training_slides.pdf. 
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      Table 2: PART Ratings, 2002-2006 (FY2004-FY2008 Budgets) 
Year Programs Effective Moderately Effective Adequate Ineffective 
Results Not 
Demonstrated
2002 234 6% 24% 15% 5% 50% 
2003 407 11% 26% 20% 5% 38% 
2004 607 15% 26% 26% 4% 29% 
2005 793 15% 29% 28% 4% 24% 
2006 977 17% 30% 28% 3% 22% 
 
 In addition, when OMB compared the 2006 scores with the 2002 scores for those 
234 programs evaluated in 2002, they found that the Results Not Demonstrated category had 
declined from 50% to 14%, and the Effective and Moderately Effective categories, taken 
together, comprised 48% of all programs in 2006, up from 31% in 2002.17 
 In addition to the distribution of the ratings themselves there is the question of how 
the ratings have been used in the budgeting process.  In the Bush administration’s proposed 
2008 budget, there is circumstantial evidence suggesting a relationship between PART scores 
and funding levels.  An analysis of this relationship suggested that higher PART scores 
translated into more money requested in the budget.  This can be demonstrated in two ways.  
First, 62.7 percent of “effective” programs, and 55.5 percent of “moderately effective” 
programs were recommended for an increase in 2008 (over 2007), compared to only 15.3 
percent of “ineffective” programs.  Second, the mean recommended percentage increase for 
effective and moderately effective programs was in excess of 9 percent.  Ineffective 
programs, on average, had a recommended DECREASE of 34 percent.18 
 Relying on similar data, but using regression analysis researchers have also found 
evidence that there is a relationship between executive funding recommendations and PART 
scores.  Gilmour and Lewis found that PART scores are positively associated with 
traditionally Democratic programs, although they did not observe a relationship between 
traditionally Republican programs and the scores.19 In a study for Mathematica Policy 
Research, Inc. the authors found a substantively and statistically significant relationship 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 We are grateful to our colleague Joseph Cordes for this analysis of the effect of PART ratings in the fiscal year 
2008 President’s budget (based on PART scores for calendar year 2006 compared to recommended funding 
levels in the budget for fiscal year 2008). 
19 Gilmour, J. B., & Lewis, D. E.. “Does Performance Budgeting Work?  An Examination of OMB's PART 
Scores.” Public Administration Review, (September/October 2006). 
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between PART scores and executive funding.  For a one standard deviation increase in PART 
scores, funding increased by 9 percentage points, although this effect is dependent on 
program size – with average effects of 20 percentage points for small programs and average 
effects of only 3 percentage points for large programs.  The authors estimates are consistent 
with earlier research from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and remain robust 
when including control variables for the type of program, the sponsoring agency or 
department, and estimated funding of the previous year (included to account for 
administration priorities).20 
 While the forgoing evidence suggests that PART scores have an impact on the 
executive budget request, in the U.S. budget system, the power of the purse rests with the 
separate legislative branch where evidence of PART score utility is much lower.  A GAO 
study found that the use of PART scores by Congress was hampered due to OMB’s failures 
to consult with Congress early in the process, explain its methodology, and communicate the 
information in an appropriate manner.21 While PART proponents have often viewed the 
process as an augmentation to strategic planning and performance budgeting requirements 
mandated in GPRA, opponents argue that the PART is a political tool designed to shift power 
to the executive branch.22  The fact that OMB’s program definition is inconsistent with the 
program definitions used in GPRA strategic planning requirements suggests that the ability of 
the PART process to augment GPRA requirements may be limited. 
 One major obstacle to integrating PART scores with the Congressional budget process 
is the incompatibility of programs as defined by OMB and the appropriations accounts that 
drive Congressional budgeting.  For the current article, the authors attempted to look at the 
relationship between 2006 PART scores and the Fiscal Year 2008 appropriations bills, as 
passed by the House and Senate in calendar year 2007.  Out of a random sample of 90 
evaluated programs, there are only 13 cases in which there is an obvious, direct link between 
programs as defined by OMB and the appropriations accounts described in Congressional 
Committee reports.23 24   
Challenges in linking Congressional funding to the PART evaluations come in a 
number of forms.  In some cases, the OMB has divided programs according to their purpose, 
while Congress divides programs jurisdictionally.  For example, the OMB defined 
                                                 
20 Levy, D. & Olsen, R.  “Program Performance and the President’s Budget: Do OMB PART Scores Really 
Matter?”  Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.  October 2004. 
21 Irving, S.. “Performance Budgeting: PART Focuses Attention on Program Performance, but More Can Be 
Done to Engage Congress.” Government Accountability Office.  October 2005 
22 Brass, C. “The Bush Administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART).”  Congressional Research 
Services.  November 2004. 
23 We are grateful to Robert Shea from the OMB for assistance in compiling a list of all PART evaluated 
programs. 
24 U.S. Congressional committee reports attained from Congressional Quarterly’s CQ.com on Congress.  
Committee reports were searched electronically using CQ’s keyword search tool. 
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“International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Programs, South Asia” as a State 
Department program, but in the appropriations bills, funding is listed either by nation or in the 
aggregate.  Domestically, in the Department of the Interior, OMB defined “Fish and Wildlife 
Service - Habitat Conservation” as a program, but in the appropriations accounts, funding is 
divided by state or local government recipients.  In other cases, problems in linking 
congressional funding to PART scores arise because the House and Senate report 
appropriations accounts differently.   Finally, linking funding to PART scores is particularly 
problematic in the case of programs with multiyear authorizations that are not subject to the 
annual appropriations process, as is the case with the Bank Secrecy Act Administration, 
which was another program as defined by OMB. 
While the above complications do not render a link between Congressional funding 
and PART scores prohibitive, they vastly increase the amount of time required for such 
comparisons.  Given the crowded agenda of Congressional budgeters, particularly those 
committees with yearly appropriations responsibilities, the potential for members of Congress 
to use PART scores during appropriations deliberations is seriously compromised as a result 
of the way OMB has chosen to define programs for its analysis.  Several committee reports, 
both from the 109th Congress (when the Republicans were still in charge) and the 110th (when 
the Democrats has assumed control), indicated that PART details in agency budget 
justifications had made the review of yearly budget requests more difficult as PART data has 
replaced and not supplemented traditional data with which members are more familiar: 
“Unless specifically exempted, no funds are provided in this Act to conduct or 
participate in the conduct of a PART analysis or study unless the Committees on 
Appropriations of the House and Senate have approved of the study, inclusive of the 
data on which the analysis will be based, the methodology to be employed and the 
relative weight of each of the four factors that will be assigned to the study in 
determining a final score.”25 
 “The [PART] process has failed largely through the inability of the administration to 
establish meaningful benchmarks and program goals that can be used as a valid 
measure for the success of a program and its funding requirements/need.”26 
 
                                                 
25 U.S.House,  Committee on Appropriations. “Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 2007”.  Accessed at  
http://www.cq.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/commreport/109/comm
report109-000002308390.html@allbillsarchive&metapub=CQ-COMRPTS&searchIndex=0&seqNum=9 
26 U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Report on Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations for Transportation, 
Housing, Urban Development, and Related Agencies.  July 16, 2007. 
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“OMB and Federal agencies have tended to accommodate an increasing amount of 
PART performance data in the budget justifications by eliminating fundamental and 
objective programmatic budget data that is critical to the work of the [Appropriations] 
Committee. This trend has made it increasingly difficult for the Committee to perform 
a meaningful review of budget justifications, including the ability to conduct 
necessary budget oversight work as well as the ability to reach valid and 
comprehensive funding decisions”27 
“Most [agency budget] justifications continue to be filled with references to the 
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), drowning in pleonasm, and yet still devoid 
of useful information… The Committee finds little use for a budget justification which 
does not reveal specific details of the measurable indicators and standards used to 
evaluate a program’s performance, relevance, or adherence to underlying authorization 
statute. Further, the Committee has little patience for secretaries and administrators 
who cannot explain the rationale behind a program’s funding level other than ‘the 
PART score,’ ‘getting to green,’ or ‘this is what OMB provided.’”28 
 
 Given the forgoing expressions of Congressional resentment of the PART, it is 
unlikely that there is a strong relationship between PART scores and legislative funding.  
Table 3 lists the 13 programs for which appropriations data could be readily traced to 2006 
PART scores, along with the House and Senate recommended changes in funding.  While the 
three programs rated “effective” all received recommended funding increases, there does not 
appear to be a relationship between the other scores and recommended funding levels.   
Given the small sample size, these examples are not intended to be representative but rather a 
venue for future research. 
 
Conclusions 
There are many possible conclusions that might be drawn from the U.S. government’s 
experience with the PART so far, but four seem particularly salient in the current context. 
1.  It is important to attend to the relationship between performance measurement and budget 
structure in devising any new system.  The PART process is well aligned with the executive 
budget in the United States and evidence suggests that OMB and the president use PART 
                                                 
27 U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Report on Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations for Financial Services 
and General Government and Related Agencies.  June 13, 2007. 
28 U.S. House Committee on Appropriations Report on Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations for Financial Services 
and General Government and Related Agencies.  June 22, 2007. 
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scores when making funding decisions.  However, there is limited evidence that Congress 
finds the PART scores at all useful, largely due to the fact that reporting processes are 
incompatible with existing budget structures.  For other countries with constitutionally 
fragmented budget processes, the design of a system similar to the PART should begin by 
asking who is the most important intended audience. 
 
2.  Understanding the desirable relationship between funding and performance is critical to 
determining the success or failure of performance budgeting systems. In the literature on the 
use of performance information, a frequently used method (one also employed in the present 
study) is to attempt to link performance scores with funding levels.  This approach, however, 
rests upon the premise that it is a good thing to create a direct linkage between performance 
and funding.  The OECD characterizes performance budgeting as falling into one of three 
categories: presentational, informed, and direct linkage.  With presentational performance 
budgeting, performance information is collected and reported in the budget process, but not 
used during resource allocation.  Informed performance budgeting indicates that performance 
information is used, but that the relationship between funding levels and performance scores 
is not always positive.  Direct linkage performance budget occurs when there is always a 
positive relationship between performance scores and funding levels; and is very rare among 
OECD countries.29   
One of the reasons that direct performance budgeting is rare, is that its normative 
justification has yet to be established.  First, poor performance may be an indicator of 
inadequate funding, a problem that will not be remedied when additional funding cuts are 
made.  If the program is important to the citizens, increased funding is the most likely way to 
improve outcomes.  An additional risk of direct performance budgeting is that it will evolve 
into incremental budgeting, though at a significantly higher cost.  Each budget cycle agencies 
report incremental performance increases and receive incremental budget increases.  Although 
no real evaluation or analysis of performance data occurs, the costs of collecting the 
performance information is still born by the government.  Thus, directly tying performance 
information to funding levels may have negative unintended consequences if executed with 
insufficient attention to detail.   
                                                 
29 Curristine, T. “Performance Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD Questionnaire.” OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, 5(1608-7143) 2005. 
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Table 3: Comparisons of PART Scores and Congressional Funding Levels  for 13 Comparable 
Programs 
Program Name PART Score House Recommended 
Change in Funding (%) 
Senate Recommended 
Change in Funding (%) 
Black Lung Clinics Ineffective 0.0 1.9 
Child and Adult Care 
Food Program 
Adequate 5.4 5.4 
U.S. Fire 
Administration 
Adequate 4.7 4.7 
Education for 
Homeless Children 
and Youths 
Adequate 8.1 8.1 
Contributions to 
International 
Organizations 
Moderately 
effective 
13.1 17.4 
Early Reading First 
 
Moderately 
effective 
-2.7 0.0 
Government National 
Mortgage Association 
Moderately 
effective 
0.0 -9.8 
Consumer Product 
Safety Commission 
Effective 6.6 12.0 
Indian Housing Loan 
Guarantees 
Effective 24.2 24.2 
International 
Boundary and Water 
Commission 
Effective 200.1* 1590.1* 
Commission on Civil 
Rights 
Results not 
demonstrated 
0.3 0.3 
Compassion Capital 
Fund 
Results not 
demonstrated 
0.0 -16.7 
Delta Regional 
Authority 
Results not 
demonstrated 
51.5 51.5 
* These very large increases can be traced to the fact that both the House and Senate included capital funding to 
build a fence between the United States and Mexico with the program’s budget. 
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3. While it may seem desirable to employ a system that is as comprehensive as the PART 
(that is, one that looks at all or most programs), a “one size fits all” approach can impede the 
ability of government officials and citizens to understand the differences between programs.  
As noted above, the PART uses a standard questionnaire and set of scores to compare 
programs to one other with the benefit of allowing programs that are quite dissimilar to be 
compared.  The down side of such an approach is that it may force programs into a 
methodological “box” that inhibits the understanding of complex differences between 
programs.  This is particularly true under the PART as many of the questions used in the 
evaluation are of the “yes/no” variety, when the real answer in many cases is “maybe” or 
“sometimes”. 
4. While the PART fits firmly within the recent management tradition of the federal 
government, it is not clear whether it will survive into the next U.S. Presidential 
administration.  Since some of the leadership of the Congress has been openly hostile to the 
PART, and since it is so closely identified with the Bush administration, the next President 
may be hesitant to continue this specific program.  This is particularly true because there is 
suspicion (borne out by some of the research cited earlier) that the PART is just a 
sophisticated way to collect ammunition to cut some domestic programs that are opposed by 
the Bush administration. On the other hand, recent trends in federal management would 
suggest that the next President (whoever he or she may be) is likely to embrace some 
management reform ideas that will be consistent with the stated goals of the PART—that is, 
improving the understanding of policymakers concerning what works and what doesn’t.  
In the end, the PART is likely to be seen as another in the long line of performance-
oriented reform efforts that has improved the availability of information on performance, and 
has also encouraged its use by both federal politicians and managers.  But such an approach 
has inherent problems, not the least of which are a conceptual understanding of exactly how 
to link budget and performance data, and the creation of incentives for people to use the 
information that is produced by such systems.  In the United States, performance-informed 
budgeting is very much a work in progress. 
